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Preface
California’s Global Warming Solutions Act, also known as AB 32, was signed into law on 
September 27, 2006. Environmental Defense Fund co-sponsored the bill, which stated that 
California “may” adopt a market-based regulation to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
That market-based regulation, a cap-and-trade program, is one of many efforts developed 
and implemented over the last seven years to reduce the state’s GHG emissions to 1990 
levels by 2020.
With the debut and implementation of the cap-and-trade program in 2013, California has 
once again proven to be a leader in environmental policy in the United States. Not only is the 
state setting an example for the rest of the country in addressing GHG emissions, it’s doing so 
in a flexible, economically efficient fashion, allowing the economy to prosper, while improving 
public health.
The data and observations presented in this report provide tangible evidence of the program’s 
success in its first year. The allowance auction process has gone well, the secondary market has 
shown stability, and prices indicate low marginal abatement costs for compliance entities thus 
far. The smooth transition to a capped economy is an impressive accomplishment, due in large 
part to a carefully con structed regulation that involved a rigorous stakeholder engagement 
process and leveraged international lessons learned in building market-based mechanisms.
Today, California is a bright spot not only in the U.S., but internationally as well. California’s 
regional leadership is evident through the Western Climate Initiative and the recently signed 
Pacific Coast Collaborative Climate Action Plan. Beyond North America, the memorandums 
of under standing (MoUs) signed with China and Australia show that California’s program 
is already regarded internationally as a leading model.
There is still work to be done to ensure that the program continues on a path of success 
to 2020 and beyond. Organizations like IETA and EDF will continue to provide input towards 
achieving this goal. Building deeper collaborations and alliances in the coming years—not 
only across jurisdictions, but also across businesses and regulators—will be critical to ensure 
emissions reductions are achieved in a manner that allows our economy to prosper as the 
scope of the cap broadens in 2015 and the interaction with complementary measures is 
better understood.
As we know, California cannot solve the problem of climate change alone. The linked 
California and Quebec carbon market launching in 2014 is an important development, which, 
if successful, has the potential to encourage other jurisdictions to come forward with programs 
of their own. Further, upcoming federal action on power plants through Clean Air Act 111(d) 
standards will put an even greater spotlight on California from states that are looking for 
cost-effective solutions to reduce emissions and meet U.S. EPA guidelines.
It’s been a long and, at times, arduous process from the passage of AB 32 to the eventual 
imple mentation of California’s landmark cap-and-trade program. However, after its inaugural 
year, most would agree that the state has developed a program to be proud of—one that is 
poised for future success and emulation across other economies, both inside and outside 
U.S. borders.
Dirk Forrister, President and Chief Executive Officer
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
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Executive summary
January 1, 2014 marked one year since the start of California’s landmark cap-and-trade program, 
a market-based system to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution. The program will be the 
second-largest carbon market in the world, after the European Union’s, and will cover 85% of all 
carbon pollution in the state by 2015. It is the most discussed program in a suite of strategies 
being deployed to achieve the goal of California’s Global Warming Solutions Act—also known as 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32)—a 2006 law requiring the state to reduce GHG emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020. California is the eighth-largest economy in the world and the first state in the nation to 
employ an economy-wide cap-and-trade program. While no state or country can stop climate 
change alone, California’s environmental policies have a history of success and replication. The 
importance of California’s program is thus magnified by the example it sets, and the world is 
watching to see whether the state’s carbon market will succeed.
One year into the program, the outlook is positive. California’s cap-and-trade system 
weathered legal challenges and demonstrated a successful launch and viability during its initial 
year. In the first five auctions, all of the offered emission allowances usable for com pliance in 
2013 were sold. Similarly, the secondary market for carbon allowances has shown stability, and 
carbon prices close to the floor indicate the long-term possibility of low marginal abatement 
costs for regulated entities. Contrary to some predictions of harsh economic damage, capping 
carbon pollution in California has occurred amidst sustained and promising economic recovery 
and growth, including a stronger housing market and lower unemployment rate.
This report provides an overview and analysis of California’s carbon market after one year 
in operation. Included are a background on the cap-and-trade program, an account of the 
carbon market’s progress to date, and an analysis of what the market’s performance means 
for California’s environmental and economic goals. This analysis includes in-depth summaries 
and trends observed from the quarterly auctions and secondary market activity, along with 
evaluations of market performance by industry experts and academics. Updates regarding 
litigation, proposed regulatory amendments, and international agreements are also discussed.
Five key conclusions from the program’s first year and five key considerations for the 
program’s future are highlighted on pages vii and viii.
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First year conclusions
1.  The successful state-run auctions are evidence of a well-constructed, strong, and adaptive 
policy. California had the good fortune of learning from predecessor cap-and-trade programs 
like the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) and the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI). The five successful quarterly auctions conducted thus far are evidence 
of a strong design for California’s program. Each auction has shown a solid demand for 
current year allowances, with numerous compliance entities participating and allowance 
prices remaining stable and reasonable. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has 
developed a robust administrative framework. To date, there have been no signs of market 
manipulation, the auction platform and logistics have been straightforward, and key market 
communications have been timely and well managed.
2.  The secondary market for California carbon allowances is robust and healthy. Although 
the offset market was quiet, late 2013 issuance of CARB offset credits suggests greater 
offset market activity lies ahead. Since the first auction commenced, allowance prices have 
stabilized on the secondary market and the volume of traded allowances has increased. This 
reflects increased confidence, familiarity, and participation in the market. Furthermore, since 
CARB offset credits have been issued and the first surrender date for compliance instruments 
by regulated entities approaches in November, it is likely that increased interest in the market 
will result in more offset transactions.
3.  Wise investment of the auction proceeds will be an integral part of achieving the state’s 
AB 32 pollution reduction goals. State auction proceeds—$533 million to date—will boost 
clean energy in California, improve air quality, and create jobs. California law requires 
that auction proceeds be invested in further reducing GHG emissions. Although the goal 
of the cap-and-trade program is not to raise money, this first year of auctions has shown 
that a meaningful amount of money can be generated from the sale of allowances. While 
Governor Brown has taken a one-time loan of $500 million from the state’s auction proceeds, 
he has committed to return these funds and invest future funds to cut carbon pollution. 
Further more, as required under law passed in 2011, at least 25% of the proceeds must be 
invested in a manner that benefits disadvantaged communities in California that are most 
impacted by climate change and poor environmental quality.
4.  The average price for allowances suggests that achieving the cap may be less costly than 
some expected. Some critics of the program, including regulated businesses, have expressed 
fear of high compliance costs from AB 32. The reality of current allowance prices—just over 
$11—is in stark contrast to those fears, and shows that the cost of emissions reductions will 
be much lower in this first compliance period than previously expected. Even if prices hover 
above the floor, the cap ensures reductions will be met and that companies will incorporate 
the cost of carbon into their strategic planning.
5.  Market experts interviewed for this report expressed overwhelming positive views 
regarding the first-year performance of California’s cap-and-trade program. In addition to 
noting the auction mechanism is well designed, experts felt the complete sale of current 
allowances and improved liquidity in the secondary market are encouraging signs of a well-
functioning market. All of those interviewed were confident that the market is here to stay and 
highlighted the importance of post-2020 goals.
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Future considerations
While the data presented in this report indicate the first year of cap and trade in California has 
been a success, there are upcoming program milestones and other important factors that may 
impact the market.
1.  The end of the first compliance period: California will know more about the program’s 
success in November 2014 when regulated entities will first have to surrender allowances. At 
that time, the state and general public will have additional information about how the 
program is functioning, what emissions reductions have been achieved, and how entities are 
meeting their compliance obligations.
2.  Linkage with Quebec: California and Quebec formally linked their cap-and-trade programs 
beginning on January 1, 2014. The Quebec linkage expands the market and provides regulated 
entities greater flexibility in meeting their compliance obligations cost-effectively. More 
importantly, it paves the way for other linkages which could create greater environmental and 
economic benefits.
3.  Proposed cap-and-trade regulation amendments: Continued market oversight has resulted 
in a list of proposed cap-and-trade regulation amendments scheduled for consideration in 
spring 2014. One such amendment includes maintaining the integrity of price containment 
mechanisms, including credible offsets. Offsets, banking, and other cost containment 
mechanisms will continue to be important features of the cap-and-trade program.
4.  Fuels coming under the cap in 2015: The cap more than doubles in size to include 
distributors of transportation fuels and natural gas on January 1, 2015, the start of the second 
compliance period. Under the current regulation, suppliers of transportation fuels will not 
receive any free allowances, meaning they will be required to purchase allowances to cover 
their emissions. This will significantly impact the supply and demand outlook for carbon 
allowances.
5.  Post-2020 goals: Cap and trade, in combination with complementary measures like the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard and Low Carbon Fuel Standard, are keeping California on 
track to meet 2020 reduction targets. However, California must set post-2020 goals in order 
to provide regulated entities with certainty moving forward. With legal challenges mostly 
overcome and regulated entities showing stronger demand for future vintage allowances, 
California is seeing more confidence in the longevity of the market. Conversations about 
setting a 2030 carbon pollution reduction target have begun and it is crucial for policymakers 
to think about post-2020 program design elements to ensure more ambitious reductions can 
be met at reasonable costs.
California cap-and-trade 
policy: an overview
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Legislative history of Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32)
On September 27, 2006, California enacted the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), which 
aims to reduce California’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. This 
represents a roughly 16% reduction from the business-as-usual scenario, from 507 to 4271 
million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MMTCO2e)2 (see Figure 1).
To accomplish California’s emissions reduction mandate, AB 32 authorized the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB) to establish a market-based cap-and-trade regulation alongside 
complementary emissions reduction measures, which are laid out in CARB’s Scoping Plan.3 
To ensure the program’s success, expert advisory groups such as the Emissions Market 
Assessment Committee4 and the Economic and Allocation Advisory Committee5 were formed 
to aid in the regulation’s development. Additionally, lessons learned from the European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) and the emissions trading program of nine states in the 
northeastern United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), were taken into 
careful consideration during this time.6 With extensive stakeholder input, research, and analysis, 
the enforceable cap-and-trade program officially began on January 1, 2013.
Cap-and-trade model
Cap and trade is not a new environmental solution. It was successfully used to control sulfur 
dioxide (acid rain) pollution from power plants in the U.S.7 This program, established by the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, harnessed the power of the marketplace to reduce acid rain 
pollution significantly, spurring The Economist to call it “the greatest green success story of the 
past decade.”8
The “cap” refers to the absolute limit on pollutant emissions that is set for all sectors covered 
by the regulation. The number of allowances available for use within the program corresponds 
to this cap. By limiting the total number of allowances to a specified amount, the government 
FIGURE 1
AB 32 emissions reduction target compared  
to the business-as-usual scenario
Source: Historical 2000 to 2011 GHG Emissions Data9 and Emissions Forecast10 from California Air Resources Board
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An allowance is a limited tradable 
authorization, like a permit, to emit 
up to one metric ton of carbon 
dioxide equivalent.
 The hyphenated term  
cap-and-trade is used  
through out as an adjective 
modifier, while the unhyphenated 
term cap and trade is used  
as a noun. For all intents and 
purposes, the hyphenation 
differences do not change the 
meaning of the term.
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can ensure the aggregate emissions do not exceed the cap’s set level. If a market participant 
holds extra allowances that it does not need for its compliance obligation, it can sell them to 
other participants who need those allowances. This is the “trade.”
California’s cap-and-trade program
Under California’s cap-and-trade program for carbon pollution, a stringent cap with a specific 
number of emission allowances is set forth in Table 6-1 of §95841 of the regulation (Annual 
Allowance Budgets for Calendar Years 2013–2020). Pursuant to the regulation, allowances are 
distributed to regulated businesses by the state, either given for free or sold at auction. At the 
end of each compliance period, companies must surrender allowances back to the government 
sufficient to cover their compliance obligation, which is based on their emissions. Companies 
failing to meet compliance requirements must pay penalties, as is the case in other regulatory 
programs.11 Every year, the total number of available allowances (either given for free or 
auctioned) decreases, driving emissions down over time. This is known as a “declining cap.”
By setting a statewide cap instead of company or sector-specific levels, the program gives each 
regulated entity the freedom to decide how it will comply. Companies can purchase addi tional 
allowances beyond those they receive for free, or invest in emissions reduction projects that leave 
them with extra allowances that can be sold to other businesses. The cap-and-trade program 
also allows regulated entities to use verified reductions from uncapped sectors (offsets) to meet 
up to 8% of their compliance obligations in any one year.12 This variety of compliance options 
provides flexibility to regulated entities, which lowers the overall cost of the program.13
The central elements of the program include:
•  The cap: California’s cap declines every year. From the first to the second year, the cap tightens 
by about three million metric tons of emissions, or 1.9%. In 2015, suppliers of transportation 
fuels, natural gas, and other fuels come under the regulation, expanding the covered pollution 
by about 1½ times. Thereafter, the cap decreases by approximately 12 million metric tons of 
emissions every year, or an average annual decrease of 3.3% (see Figure 2).14 The cap declines 
An offset credit represents one 
metric ton of GHG emissions 
that is reduced or removed by 
an activity not covered by the 
cap-and-trade program in order 
to compensate for, or “offset,” 
an emission made by a regulated 
facility. Offset credits must meet 
strict regulatory reporting and 
oversight criteria and must fall 
under a protocol that has been 
approved by CARB.
FIGURE 2
The declining cap and the business-as-usual  
emissions projections through 2020
Source: California Air Resources Board15
G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
o
ns
 (
M
M
TC
O
2e
)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
CapUncapped sectors, business-as-usual projection
Capped sectors, business-as-usual projection
4 CALIFORNIA CARBON MARKET WATCH / California cap-and-trade policy: an overview
Advanced Clean Cars, 4 MMTCO2e
more moderately in the program’s first compliance period to ensure a smooth transition to a 
capped economy.
•  GHG emissions reporting and verification: Emissions reporting requirements have been in place 
since 2008, when CARB adopted a mandatory reporting rule requiring all major GHG sources to 
submit emissions reports every year. That rule was later harmonized with the U.S. EPA Greenhouse 
Gas Reporting Rule. The data from the reporting rule has allowed CARB to develop a cap-and-
trade program based on actual measured emissions, as opposed to estimates, and allows the 
agency to continue monitoring California’s progress towards its reduction goals.16
•  Emissions coverage: California’s emissions sources are varied in scope, with the leading 
contributors in 2020 projected to be the transportation sector (36%), the power sector (20%), 
and heavy industry (18%).17 Starting in 2013, major GHG-emitting sources, such as electricity 
generation (including imports) and large stationary sources (e.g., refineries, oil and gas 
production facilities, food processing plants, cement production facilities, and glass 
manufacturing facilities) that emit more than 25,000 metric tons of CO2 equivalent per year 
are regulated by the program. In 2015, the program expands to include distributors of 
transportation fuels, natural gas, and other fuels.18 At that time, this comprehensive program 
will cover approximately 85% of the state’s total emissions (see Figure 3).
Source: California Air Resources Board19,20
FIGURE 3
Scope of the cap-and-trade program and its complementary policies under AB 32
SB 375 Sustainable Communities, 3 MMTCO2e
Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 15 MMTCO2e
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 11 MMTCO2e
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Cap-and-trade Program, 18 MMTCO2e
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Leakage is defined by CARB as 
“a reduction in GHG emissions 
within the state that is offset 
by an increase in GHG emissions 
outside the state.”24
•  Compliance periods: A compliance period is the time frame during which aggregate 
compliance obligations are calculated. At the end of each year, and within a specified time 
after the end of each compliance period, each regulated facility must turn in the appropriate 
number of credits to cover their emissions over that time. California’s program has three 
compliance periods:21
First compliance period: 2013 through 2014
Second compliance period: 2015 through 2017
Third compliance period: 2018 through 2020
•  Allowance allocation: To protect electricity ratepayers from price spikes in their electricity 
bills, CARB gives allowances for free to electrical distribution utilities. According to a decision 
by the California Public Utilities Commission, major regulated utilities must consign their 
allowances to auction and use the proceeds from the sale of their allowances to benefit 
ratepayers. To ensure that California businesses remain competitive, transition smoothly into 
the program, and to prevent emissions leakage, CARB also initially provides industrial entities 
with most of their allowances for free.22 For most sectors, the percentage given for free then 
decreases as the program progresses according to leakage risk classification.23 In the first 
compliance period, the average industrial entity receives about 90% of the allowances for free. 
Recent proposed amendments may extend this level of transition assistance into the second 
compliance period for specified regulated sectors.
•  Auctions: Allowances that are 1) not given away for free according to the regulation, or 
2) consigned by regulated utilities, are sold at state auctions administered and overseen by 
CARB.25 The auctions use a single-round, sealed-bid, uniform-price format. Participants 
submit confidential bids for a specific amount of allowances at a specific price, also called a 
bid schedule. The highest bidder in the auction is sold their requested quantity of allowances 
first, then the second highest bidder, and so on until there are no more allowances. All winning 
bidders receive the quantity of allowances they bid for at a uniform settlement price, which is 
determined as the value of the lowest winning bid, also known as the auction clearing price. 
Regardless of their original bids, all winning bidders pay the same price.26
Auctions are held quarterly—every February, May, August, and November—and bids are 
submitted through an online platform. Two types of allowances are auctioned—current year 
vintage and future year vintage allowances. Current year allowances are eligible for use starting 
in the year they are auctioned, while future year allowances can be banked for later use but 
may not be used for compliance until their vintage year (typically three years after the year in 
which they were auctioned).27 For example, in the four auctions held in 2013, the current year 
allowances offered for sale were 2013 vintage and the future year allowances offered were 2016 
vintage. Auctioning of future vintage allowances enables compliance entities to plan or bank 
for future compliance.28
•  Price stability: The floor or minimum price per allowance is set in the regulation at $10 
in 2012, and increases by 5% plus the rate of inflation as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) for all urban consumers each year thereafter.29 To ensure that prices do not spike 
drastically, a percentage of allowances from 2013–2020 are set aside at the beginning of the 
program in an Allowance Price Containment Reserve (APCR). If needed these allowances 
are offered for sale through a reserve auction at three pre-set price tiers: $40, $45, and $50, 
which also increase by 5% annually plus the rate of inflation. Once all of the allowances in 
the first price tier are sold, allowances will then be sold at the second tier price and so forth. 
These reserve auctions are scheduled to take place six weeks after each quarterly auction if 
requested by participants,30 but no reserve auctions have been held to date, as market prices 
have remained significantly below the lowest price tier of $40.
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•  Offsets: Compliance entities can use offsets to cover up to 8% of their compliance obliga-
tions.31 The provision of credible offsets provides an important cost containment mechanism 
by increasing the supply of low-price compliance options.32 Offsets also encourage and 
provide economic value for emissions reductions in sectors not covered by the cap. Protocols 
currently approved by CARB include:33
• U.S. forest projects
• Urban forest projects
• Livestock projects
• Ozone depleting substances (ODS) projects
While the cap-and-trade program is sometimes referred to as the cornerstone of California’s 
climate change program, it is only one of a varied suite of policies implemented to help the 
state reach its GHG reduction goals. Cap and trade acts as a “safety net” for California, ensuring 
that all necessary reductions occur to meet the 2020 target, even if the estimated reductions 
from other measures fall short.34 Therefore, the amount of reductions attributed to the cap-
and-trade program will depend on the performance of the other policies. According to CARB’s 
July 2013 update to the legislature, cap and trade will provide approximately 22.5% of the 
reductions needed to reach 1990 emission levels (see Figure 3, page 4).35
Cap and trade acts as a “safety net” for California, ensuring that all 
necessary reductions occur to meet the 2020 target, even if the estimated 
reductions from other measures fall short.
State of the carbon market
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Quarterly auctions
The successful state-run auctions are evidence of a well-constructed, strong, and  
adaptive policy.
Auctions are an important part of the cap-and-trade program because they provide an oppor-
tunity for price discovery. The settlement price of each auction acts as a periodic measure of 
how the market values the underlying asset, the emissions allowance. Auctions also ensure an 
efficient and fair distribution of allowances and prevent windfall profits for certain participants 
at the expense of others.36 So far, California has held five auctions through which compliance 
and non-compliance entities have purchased more than 117 million allowances.37 CARB has 
estimated it will auction approximately 118 million allowances in 2014.38
•  Settlement price: In the auction of 2013 vintage allowances (current auction), the settlement 
price per allowance climbed from just above the floor at $10.09 in the first auction to $14.00 
in May 2013, and then settled at $11.48 in the last auction of 2013 (see Table 1, page 9). The 
volume-weighted average settlement price over all five auctions was $12.00, which is 12% 
over the floor price. A $3.91 range in auction settlement price with no significant spikes 
indicates a smooth transition to a capped economy. In addition, recent settlement prices 
closer to the floor price reflect a lower-than-expected cost of compliance for regulated entities 
in this first compliance period, giving entities sufficient time to adapt to the cap and make any 
needed emissions reductions before the floor price rises in later compliance years. 
In the advance auction of future vintage allowances for use starting in three years’ time, 
the settlement price remained at the floor price for the first three auctions, after which the 
price per allowance increased to $11.10 in the last two auctions (see Table 2, page 9). This price 
increase indicates growing demand for future credits during the second half of the year.
•  Volume: In all five auctions, every 2013 vintage allowance available for sale was purchased 
(see Table 1, page 9). Full subscription in the current vintage auctions indicates a competitive 
market and a healthy interest from market participants. The first five auctions also demon-
strated a strong level of competition shown by a cumulative ratio of 1.66 bids placed compared 
to the number of allowances available for sale. This means that approximately 53.9 million more 
bids were made than could be filled. In the advanced auctions, both 2015 and 2016 vintage 
allowances were auctioned. 14% of 2015 vintage allowances and 81% of 2016 vintage allow ances 
available were purchased (see Table 2, page 9). The last two auctions saw the complete sale of 
future allowances, reflecting growing confidence in the future and longevity of the market.
•  Participation: Across all five auctions, there have been 142 unique qualified bidders (see 
Table 3, page 9). The increasing number of regulated companies registered to participate in at 
least one of the quarterly auctions is an indication that a growing proportion of market 
participants are planning their compliance strategies and adjusting to participation in the 
carbon market. In-depth analysis shows that 40 companies have registered for four out of the 
five auctions, while 33 have registered for all five. This indicates there is a core group of 
companies consistently requesting access to the auction process. The companies that 
registered for all five auctions were primarily power suppliers and major oil and gas interests.
Of the unique qualified bidders, 75% were compliance entities, while the rest were com-
panies with no compliance obligations and involved in the market most likely for financial 
or speculative purposes. The breakdown of registered bidders by type as shown in Figure 4, 
page 10, shows substantial participation from electricity generators and importers of 
electricity, who represented approximately 56% of California’s capped emissions in 2013.39 
Overall, the participant pool is diverse, with representation from all regulated sectors.
Qualified bidders are entities that 
have been approved to participate 
in the quarterly auctions. Whether 
or not the approved participants 
actually submit bids in the auction 
is confidential information.
The last day of market data 
collection for this report was 
November 30, 2013.
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TABLE 1
Current auction of 2013 vintage allowances
Nov 2012 Feb 2013 May 2013 Aug 2013 Nov 2013
Floor price $10.00 $10.71 $10.71 $10.71 $10.71
Settlement price $10.09 $13.62 $14.00 $12.22 $11.48
Current allowances 
offered
23,126,110 12,924,822 14,522,048 13,865,422 16,614,526
Current allowances 
purchased
23,126,110 12,924,822 14,522,048 13,865,422 16,614,526
% of current 
allowances purchased
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
# of bids: # sold (ratio) 1.06 2.47 1.78 1.62 1.82
Source: California Air Resources Board Auction Information40
TABLE 2
Advance auction of future vintage allowances
(2015 and 2016 vintage)
Nov 2012* Feb 2013 May 2013 Aug 2013 Nov 2013
Floor price $10.00 $10.71 $10.71 $10.71 $10.71
Settlement price $10.00 $10.71 $10.71 $11.10 $11.10
Future allowances 
offered
39,450,000 9,560,000 9,560,000 9,560,000 9,560,000
Future allowances 
purchased
5,576,000 4,440,000 7,515,000 9,560,000 9,560,000
% of future allowances 
purchased
14.1% 46.4% 78.6% 100.0% 100.0%
# of bids: # sold (ratio) 0.14 0.46 0.79 1.69 1.64
* 2015 vintage allowances were sold at the November 2012 advanced auction while 2016 vintage allowances 
were sold at all of the advanced auctions in 2013.
Source: California Air Resources Board Auction Information41
TABLE 3
Qualified bidder breakdown
 Nov 2012 Feb 2013 May 2013 Aug 2013 Nov 2013
% compliance entities 87.7% 79.1% 74.1% 78.5% 75.0%
# of registered bidders 73 91 81 79 76
# of new bidders 73 40 14 9 6
Source: California Air Resources Board Auction Information42
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The main difference between an 
investor-owned utility (IOU) and 
a publicly-owned utility (POU) 
is how they are owned. An IOU 
gets funding from a variety of 
shareholders who invest money 
by buying stock. In California, 
there are three IOUs: Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company, Southern 
California Edison and San Diego 
Gas & Electric. A POU, however, 
cannot be listed on the stock 
exchange, and receives money 
from a group of customer owners. 
Examples of POUs include 
Sacramento Municipal Utility 
District and Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power.
FIGURE 4
Breakdown of qualified bidders across all auctions by type
Source: California Air Resources Board Auction Information43
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Auction proceeds
Wise investment of cap-and-trade auction proceeds can be an integral part of achieving 
AB 32 emission reduction goals.
The first five auctions have raised a total of $1.37 billion – $532 million from the sale of 
state allowances and $836 million from the sale of utility allowances (see Figure 5, page 11). 
By law, all proceeds from the auction of non-utility allowances are deposited into the state’s 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund and are required to be invested in GHG reductions through 
activities like renewable energy, energy efficiency, advanced vehicles, water and natural resource 
conservation, and waste reduction.44 Pursuant to Senate Bill 535 (De León), at least 25% of the 
auction proceeds must be spent on programs that benefit disadvantaged communities, 
which disproportionately suffer from air pollution, and a minimum of 10% must directly fund 
projects in those communities.45 The California Environmental Protection Agency has identified 
disadvantaged communities’ zip codes based on geographic, socioeconomic, public health, 
and environmental hazard criteria.46 Pursuant to Assembly Bill 1532 (Pérez), the Department 
of Finance, in collaboration with CARB, has developed a three-year investment plan for the 
state-controlled auction proceeds.47 Although Governor Brown has taken a one-time loan of 
$500 million from the state’s auction proceeds to put towards the General Fund, he has 
committed to returning these funds.
The $836 million in proceeds from utility allowances come from both investor-owned 
utilities (IOUs) and from publicly-owned utilities (POUs). As required by the California 
Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the IOUs must consign their allowances at auction 
and the proceeds of these sales must go back to their customers. The CPUC has also 
ruled that 85% ($659.7 million to date) of IOU utility allowance proceeds must go back 
to households, 10% ($77.6 million to date) to small business and 5% ($38.8 million to date) 
to leakage exposed businesses.48 POUs are not mandated, but may also decide to consign 
some of their allowances to auction.
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Secondary market
The secondary market for California carbon allowances is robust and healthy, reflecting 
increased confidence, familiarity, and participation in the California carbon market.
With the advent of California’s first cap-and-trade auction in November 2012, a secondary 
market for the sale of GHG allowances and allowance derivatives has developed. This secondary 
market consists of trades in 1) current and future vintage allowances, 2) current and future GHG 
offsets, and 3) contracts to deliver valid allowances and offsets in the future (termed “futures 
contracts”), and is similar to secondary markets developed alongside other environmental and 
commodities markets. This market is seen as an indicator of overall carbon market health and is 
helpful in understanding price and liquidity trends.
As shown by the clearing prices across the largest trading exchange, the 
IntercontinentalExchange (ICE), allowance prices on the secondary market have stabilized 
while trade volumes have increased (see Figure 6, page 12). Greater trade volumes indicate 
increasing liquidity in the secondary market. During the first half of 2013, the average 
daily volume of trades made across all futures contracts on ICE was about 372,900. In the 
second half of 2013, up to the end of November, this daily average increased to about 408,000 
(an increase of about 9%). The average daily volume for the year overall was 389,100 allowances. 
While this is a moderate volume day-to-day, it represents a small fraction of the number of 
Liquidity is a measure of how 
easy it is to convert an asset to 
cash or how rapidly the asset can 
be sold. In this market, greater 
liquidity signifies a healthier 
market because it means that 
com panies are able to buy and 
sell emissions allowances in 
a timely manner to fulfill com­
pliance obligations.
FIGURE 5
Total quarterly auction proceeds from the first five auctions
Source: California Air Resources Board Auction Information49
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The benchmark contract is 
the term for the contract that is 
the most heavily traded on the 
secondary market, and as such, 
has the most liquidity and price 
transparency. Accordingly, 
benchmark contract prices are 
commonly used as a point of 
reference. In 2013, the benchmark 
contract was set by for the trade 
of the sale of current allowances 
(2013 vintage) with a delivery 
date of December 2013. The 
benchmark contract for future 
allowances was for trade of 2016 
vintage allowances with a delivery 
date of December 2015.
FIGURE 6
Allowance price and traded volume on the secondary market
(Vintage 2013, December 2013 contract)
allowances sold in each auction (2.3% of the volume sold in the latest auction). Thus, more 
significant allowance acquisition is possible through the quarterly auctions than the secondary 
market. Trade volumes on the secondary market are expected to increase further as entities 
approach the date when they must surrender a portion of their allowances.
Along with volume, a good measure of liquidity in any market is the bid-ask spread. The 
“bid” is the price that someone is willing to pay for an asset, whereas the “ask” is the price at 
which someone is willing to sell. The difference between the two prices is the bid-ask spread. In 
a market with high liquidity and high volumes of trades, the spread is usually small because the 
buyer and seller tend to agree about what the price should be. As shown by secondary market 
tracking data reported by Point Carbon, the bid-ask spread has tightened since the start of the 
quarterly auctions, as is shown in Figure 7, page 13. The average end-of-week bid-ask spread 
before the first auction was $0.96, while the spread after the first auction through November 
2013 was about $0.22. This reflects increased confidence, familiarity, and participation in the 
California carbon market.
The relationship between allowance prices at auction and allowance prices on the secondary 
market is shown in Figure 8, page 13. For comparison, the price of the benchmark contract 
for the 2013 vintage year as cleared over ICE is shown alongside the settlement prices in the 
Source: IntercontinentalExchange, Inc.
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FIGURE 8
Vintage 2013, December 2013 contract price on secondary market
FIGURE 7
End-of-week bid/ask spread for Vintage 2013
December 2013 contract
Source: Point Carbon
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quarterly auctions for that same vintage year. From this comparison it is evident that, except 
for the first auction, the prices on the secondary market very closely align with the settlement 
prices of the quarterly auctions. In the last three auctions, the settlement price has served 
as a price gauge, pulling the secondary market one way or another to better align with auction 
results. The small price fluctuation seen at the beginning of the program followed by greater 
price stability at the end of the year was expected, as market participants gained a better 
understanding of their positions in the market and established their compliance strategies.
The trading of future vintage allowances on the secondary market offers useful insight into 
long-term price indicators and market health. In May 2013, there was a steep decline in price 
Why do allowance prices fluctuate over time and  
why do opinions differ over what they will be?
Just like with other goods, the price of allowances is con trolled by supply and demand. If 
there are a large number of goods (high supply) relative to how many people want that good 
(low demand), then prices are lower. If there are rela tively few allowances compared to how 
many people want them, prices will be high. The carbon allowance market is nuanced and 
expert economists often disagree about expected allowance prices. The following is a high-
level overview of several factors that can and will influence allowance prices.
The cap: The cap corresponds to the number of allowances available for purchase. The 
scarcity or abundance of tradable emissions allowances in relation to the demand for those 
allowances affects the overall market price.
The cost of reducing emissions: If it is cheaper to reduce emissions on-site—by installing a 
new energy efficient boiler, for example—than to buy allowances, businesses will reduce 
emissions on-site. The more low-cost oppor tuni ties to reduce on-site emissions, the lower the 
allowance prices. As the cap declines, some businesses will have to reduce emissions on-site.
Offsets: Regulated entities may meet up to 8% of their compliance obligation with certified 
offsets.50 By providing out-of-cap reductions to be used for compliance, offsets increase the 
potential overall supply of low-cost credits to regulated entities. However, if protocols currently 
approved by CARB cannot supply sufficient credits to meet the full offset demand, as some 
predict,51 prices of allowances will be higher than they would be with higher offset availability.
Future expectations: Since entities can “bank” allowances and save them for later use, 
many are expected to buy allowances in the near term if they expect future prices to be 
higher. In turn, this will temporarily reduce supply and may result in a commensurate 
increase in prices. Additionally, if there is an expectation that the cap-and-trade program 
will continue with a declining cap past 2020, there may exist an increased incentive to bank 
allowances and cause an upward shift in allowance prices.52
Other policies to reduce GHG emissions: California has over 70 regulations targeted to 
help the state meet the AB 32 reduction target, including the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 
the Renewable Portfolio Standard, energy efficiency policies, and clean car standards. 
CARB estimates that policies other than cap and trade will achieve about 78% of needed 
emissions reductions.53 However, if these policies do not achieve their expected reductions, 
cap and trade will assure overall reductions are still realized. More emissions reductions 
achieved through these complementary policies will create less demand for carbon 
allowances and lower prices, and vice versa.
Size of California’s economy: California’s economic growth does not have to be paired 
with corresponding growth in statewide GHG pollution. Conversely, as the state’s economy 
continues to decarbonize, steady economic growth can occur simultaneously. However, the 
decoupling of economic and emissions growth is not yet fully achieved in California, so a 
sudden drop in economic activity could mean a drop in allowance prices.
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FIGURE 9
Vintage 2016, December 2015 contract price on secondary market
Source: Settlement prices from Point Carbon, expected floor prices based on projections of CPI rate of inflation made by the Congressional Budget Office54
Mar 2013 May 2013 July 2013 Aug 2013 Oct 2013
D
ai
ly
 s
et
tle
m
en
t p
ri
ce
Expected auction floor price in 2016
Expected auction floor price in 2015
$14.50
$14.00
$13.50
$13.00
$12.50
$12.00
$11.50
for the benchmark contract for trade of Vintage 2016 allowances in response to the results of 
the third auction (see Figure 9). Excluding the data points prior to the drop in prices, the average 
trading price of this contract for Vintage 2016 allowances has been approximately $12.68. This 
is $0.55 above the expected floor price for 2015 and $0.33 under the floor price for 2016. The fact 
that this contract is trading at this relatively high price point three years before it can be used for 
compliance is an indication of market participants’ confidence that the market will be in place 
in 2016 and likely to be actively trading through 2020.
Offsets market
Although the offsets market has been quiet thus far, recent developments suggest greater 
activity ahead.
Over the past year, the market for offset credits usable for compliance by regulated entities has been 
slow to develop. This slower-than-expected growth is likely due to a series of factors, including:
•  the limited number of certified offsets protocols,
•  the high degree of prudence exercised by CARB in the verification and issuance process,
•  the potential cost burden of buyer liability and the risk of credit invalidation as perceived by 
would-be purchasers,
•  proposed legislation that could restrict the use of certain types of offsets,55
•  the fact that compliance entities do not need to retire any credits until November 2014, and
•  a belief in the long-term persistence of low carbon prices in the program as a whole.
If an offset credit is invalidated 
because it failed to create a 
meaningful emissions reduction, 
it must be replaced by a credible 
emissions reduction. In the cap-
and-trade regulation, CARB 
has placed the responsibility of 
replacing that offset on the firm 
which purchased it, otherwise 
known as buyer liability. 
Alternatively, seller liability refers 
to when the offset developer is 
held accountable for the replace-
ment of the invalidated credit.
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On September 24, 2013, the offsets market received a boost when CARB announced the 
issu ance of the first batch of certified compliance offsets, converting 611,622 early action credits 
into ARB Offset Credits, or ARBOCs. As of the end of November 2013, CARB has issued a total 
of 3,239,096 ARBOCs (see Table 4). Now that ARBOCs have been issued and the surrender date 
for com pli ance instruments by regulated entities approaches, it is likely that increased interest 
in the market will result in more transactions. Similarly, the introduction of a standard offsets 
trading contract, called the California Emissions Trading Master Agreement (see “The California 
Emissions Trading Master Agreement,” above), and the development of insurance mechanisms 
to protect against credit invalidation risk, are both working to speed up the development of 
the offsets market. Finally, the potential approval of two new offset protocols by CARB—for 
mine methane capture and rice cultivation—is expected to grow the market even further 
throughout 2014.
The California Emissions Trading Master Agreement
By Rick Saines (Principal, Baker & McKenzie LLP)
On October 2, 2013 the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) published 
a free template contract for secondary market trading of California carbon products. 
Known as the California Emissions Trading Master Agreement (CETMA), the template 
was developed over a six-month period by a drafting committee comprised of energy and 
carbon traders, lawyers, and executives at some of California’s largest covered entities—
including investor­owned utilities, fuel refiners and suppliers, and independent power 
producers—along with financial intermediaries, brokers, offset project developers, 
and others.
The result of this process is a document that clarifies and standardizes ambiguous 
regulatory concepts, provides certainty to counterparties while maintaining needed 
flexibility, and enhances overall market liquidity by lowering transaction costs for market 
participants. For instance, the CETMA contractually shifts the risk of offset invalidation from 
buyer to seller, flipping liability from regulatory default. The rationale behind this approach 
is fairly simple: by allocating offset invalidation risk to the seller, the CETMA turns what 
had been a novel and poorly understood regulatory risk into a relatively simple matter 
of counterparty credit risk, which is something all market participants are accustomed to 
analyzing. An expected result of the CETMA is a more liquid secondary market for offsets. 
Likewise, secondary market trading of allowances is expected to pick up as buyers and 
sellers continue to gain comfort with, and harmonize, key contract terms. The CETMA 
thus marks an important mile stone in the development of a strong, stable, and transparent 
carbon market in California.
TABLE 4
Number of ARB Offset Credits issued
(as of the end of November 2013)
U.S. forest Urban forest Livestock ODS Total issued
September 2013 0 0 0 611,622 611,622
October 2013 0 0 0 514,701 514,701
November 2013 1,360,806 0 31,348 719,619 2,112,773
Total 1,360,806 0 31,348 1,845,942 3,239,096
Source: California Air Resources Board Offsets Issuance56
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Carbon price forecasts
Despite forecasts of low prices, California’s carbon market will keep the state on the fast 
track to reducing emissions.
Over the last three years, several analyses have been released—by industry analysts, academic 
institutions, non-profit organizations, news organizations, and business groups—that purport 
to forecast prices and availability of credits in the AB 32 cap-and-trade program. Over time, 
these forecasts have ranged from low to high, with results dependent on input assumptions 
and calculation methodologies.
One example of the impact that carbon price forecasts can have on the market was seen in 
September 2013, when Point Carbon (PC), an industry and markets analysis firm, released a 
forecast predicting the carbon market would be oversupplied with allowances through 2019. 
According to PC, AB 32 credit prices would likely remain near the floor price through 2020.57 
This projection was 66% lower than PC’s previous estimate that forecasted $75 per allowance in 
2020.58 The cap-and-trade market prices reacted in a bearish manner to this projection, resulting 
in declining real-time allowance prices for a few weeks before leveling out at the end of September 
(see Figure 8, page 13). One reason given by PC for the drastic revision was that “emission reduction 
policies such as California’s aggressive Renewable Portfolio Standard, and slow economic recovery 
have dramatically reduced emissions in the state.”59 While some stake holders were caught off-guard 
by this forecast, several market experts have indicated that this was to be expected. For example, 
analysts from Alpha Inception note, “The truth is that the market is in oversupply by design and 
not by happenstance, which should not have been a surprise to well-informed participants. This 
was a wise and economically astute decision by CARB to ensure the program’s smooth launch.”
In addition to impacting AB 32 allowance prices, the PC estimate also revealed that California is 
on its way to meeting the statewide 2020 reduction target at lower costs than previously projected. 
While PC’s estimate may be seen as positive news from an environmental perspective, it is 
important to note it is based on market models that are limited by starting assumptions and fore -
casting uncertainties. For example, price projections in the PC model are based on the assumption 
that the program would end in 2020, even though stakeholders from all segments of the carbon 
market (see “Interviews with California carbon market experts,” page 24), as well as the staff at 
CARB,60 have voiced the necessity of setting post-2020 caps. Additionally, in a study conducted by 
Climate Connect Ltd, 71% of respondents said they believe post-2020 targets from CARB are either 
somewhat important or very important to their current outlook for near-term allowance prices.61
Linkage
Linkage is an important avenue for California to build its carbon market and maximize the 
impacts of its cap-and-trade program. Linkage with Quebec is the first step.
Pursuant to the cap-and-trade regulation, linkage means the “approval of compliance instruments 
from an external greenhouse gas emissions trading system to meet compliance obligations . . . 
and the reciprocal approval of compliance instrument issued by California to meet compliance 
obligations in an external [program].”62 According to state law adopted pursuant to Senate Bill 
1018 in 2012 (Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review), to approve linkage with an external 
program, CARB must notify the Governor that the agency intends to take such action and the 
Governor must make specified findings.63,64
The first and only jurisdiction to link with California’s cap-and-trade system to date is the 
Canadian province of Quebec. Quebec’s program, nearly identical in design to California’s, 
came into effect on January 1, 2013 with approximately 80 facilities from the industrial and 
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power generation sectors covered during the first compliance period.65 Linkage between 
Quebec and California under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) began as of January 1, 2014, 
and joint auctions are planned for later this year.66
According to the Quebec cap-and-trade law, the province’s target is to cut GHG pollution 
to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020.67 This mandate is deemed by observers as very rigorous 
considering that as of 2010, 97% of Quebec’s electricity came from renewable sources, the 
vast majority from hydropower.68 With minimal reduction opportunities in the electricity 
and manufacturing sectors, most of Quebec’s pollution cuts are expected to come from the 
transportation sector, primarily cars and trucks.69
Like California, Quebec will allow for compliance entities to use offsets to meet up to 8% 
of their compliance obligation, although only three offset protocols have been approved by 
the jurisdiction so far: a manure storage facilities protocol, landfill sites protocol, and ozone 
depleting substances protocol. Given the small number of approved protocols, as well as the 
limitation that projects under two of the protocols can only come from within the borders of 
Quebec and projects under the third only from within the borders of Canada,70 the province 
is not expected to generate a significant amount of offsets in the first compliance period.
Due to both the limited reduction potential and limited offset pool, it is projected that 
Quebec will be a net buyer of allowances from the California cap-and-trade program, though 
only in modest quantities.71 In addition, with a population of 8 million and a 2020 regulated 
emissions cap of 54.7 MMTCO2e,72 compared to California’s population of 38 million and a 2020 
regulated emis sions cap of 334.2 MMTCO2e, Quebec represents a much smaller market than 
California. Accord ingly, California will likely remain the primary driver of prices amongst the 
linked jurisdictions. Until recently, little activity had been seen in Quebec’s carbon market, but 
at the beginning of November, reports indicated that some Quebec companies have begun to 
hedge in the California market.73
Relevant litigation with developments in 2013
California’s cap-and-trade program has launched successfully despite ongoing lawsuits.
A number of prior and ongoing court challenges have added uncertainty to California’s carbon 
market, but despite these legal proceedings, the market has functioned remarkably well in its first 
year. Below are updates on the outstanding cases related to California’s cap-and-trade program:
•  Offsets challenge: In 2012, Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation 
challenged the use of offsets and charged that CARB’s adoption of four offsets protocols 
under California’s cap-and-trade program violates AB 32.74 In January 2013, a state trial court 
released a decision in favor of California, offering unequivocal support for the legality of the 
offsets portion of the program. Our Children’s Earth Foundation appealed the decision in 
California’s First Appellate District; briefing was ongoing as of date of publication and a 
hearing date has yet to be scheduled.75
•  Auction challenge: The day before the first auction in November 2012, the California Chamber 
of Commerce sued CARB, arguing that the agency did not have authority under AB 32 to hold 
auctions and that auctioning allowances resulted in an illegal tax.76 In February 2013, Morning 
Star Packing Co., a regulated entity, and other small businesses represented by the Pacific Legal 
Foundation, filed a similar suit that was considered with the Chamber case.77 In November, the 
Sacramento Superior Court found that CARB does have authority under AB 32 to hold auctions 
and that California tax law does not impose a restriction on auctioning allowances. An appeal in 
the case is expected.
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•  Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) challenges: In 2010 and 2011, ethanol and oil interests sued 
CARB in both state78 and federal79 court over the state’s LCFS. Although the LCFS is a separate 
regu lation from cap and trade under AB 32, the LCFS is expected to reduce the carbon intensity 
of fuels sold in California by 10% by 2020, and therefore have a significant impact on statewide 
emissions. Furthermore, the LCFS lawsuits involve general issues of state authority and regu-
latory process – both of which relate to the state’s cap-and-trade regulation. Currently, both 
state and federal LCFS cases are ongoing, though as of December 2013 significant rulings have 
been made in both courts allowing the LCFS to continue toward implementation. Addi tionally, 
in July 2013, the state Court of Appeal in Fresno found that errors had occurred in the process 
of adopting the state LCFS and ordered CARB to correct such errors, which is under way. As 
a result, additional administrative procedures have been implemented during adoption of 
cap-and-trade amendments to ensure compliance with regulatory process requirements.
Reported greenhouse gas emissions
Despite a slight increase in 2012 emissions, California is still on track to meet 2020 goals.
As required by AB 32, CARB developed a mandatory reporting regulation in 2008 to ensure the 
timely reporting of annual GHG pollution data by major emitters across the state.80 A closer 
look at the numbers in Table 5 shows a slight increase of statewide GHG emissions between 
2011 and 2012, mostly attributed to the closure of the San Onofre Nuclear Generation Station 
(SONGS) in Southern California and a smaller amount of hydropower available in 2012 due to 
a relatively dry winter. Both of these factors meant that in 2012, less of California’s power came 
from emissions-free sources.
As the economy continues to recover, innovation in clean technologies driven by cap and trade 
and its complementary policies will mitigate the factors that led to the increase in 2012 emissions. 
Given the current policy framework, California should readily achieve AB 32’s 2020 reduction 
goal, according to a 2013 Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory study commissioned by CARB.81
TABLE 5
Mandatory GHG emissions reporting from 2008 to 2012 
(in MMTCO2e)
Source category 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Facilities total 131,670,341 121,577,137 116,569,398 110,047,913 123,229,788
Electricity imports and 
fuel suppliers total
NA NA NA 319,239,535 314,612,368
Grand totals 131,670,341 121,577,137 116,569,398 429,287,448 437,842,156
Source: California Air Resources Board82
Proposed regulation amendments
Continued administrative oversight, economic analysis, and public input have resulted in a list 
of proposed cap-and-trade regulation amendments scheduled for consideration in spring 2014.
CARB released a set of proposed regulatory amendments to the cap-and-trade regulation for public 
comment in September 2013, following nearly 18 months of public meetings and deliberations. 
The proposed revisions cover several areas of the regulation, including, but not limited to:83
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•  adjustments to some industrial sector benchmarking methods,
•  free allocation of emissions credits to specified sectors like universities and colleges,
•  free allocation of emissions credits for legacy power contracts,
•  extension of free allocation of emissions credits to businesses for transition assistance,
•  exclusion of specified power generation facilities from the program,
•  clarifications on resource shuffling provisions and prohibitions,
•  adjustments to the Allowance Price Containment Reserve mechanism,
•  distribution of allowances to the natural gas sector,
•  adoption of an offset protocol for the reduction of mine methane emissions, and
•  information sharing and reporting by regulated entities.
After public comment, a revised rule draft was presented to CARB officials in October 2013. 
At that time, CARB staff disclosed a second set of potential regulatory amendments for develop-
ment and consideration in the near future, including:
•  modification of refinery coverage in the regulation, including provisions on product 
benchmarks, electricity and steam, hydrogen plants and calciners,
•  allocation to public wholesale water agencies,
•  reporting requirements to support market oversight,
•  information disclosure related to auction participation, and
•  market rules which may inhibit secondary market trading and liquidity.
According to CARB staff and market experts, the proposed regulatory changes are expected 
to have multiple effects on the cap-and-trade regulation. Expected results include increasing the 
ability of regulated entities to meet short and medium-term compliance obligations, protecting 
the program from credit price increases, protecting consumers from price increases associated 
with internalized program costs, and increasing the clarity of regulatory prohibitions.84 Thus, 
these changes are likely to protect the longevity of the program and ensure implementation 
through 2020.
International collaborations and  
memorandums of understanding (MoUs)
California’s program is considered a model for other sub-national and national programs, 
as demonstrated by the various MoUs signed over the program’s history.
Although it is not the first cap-and-trade program or price on GHG pollution, California’s program 
is arguably the most ambitious due to its sheer size and breadth. As such, it has been seen as a 
model for programs elsewhere in the U.S. and around the world. This has been increasingly 
evident over the past year from the various foreign governments that have requested California’s 
guidance to establish their own market-based reduction mechanisms. These MoUs do not 
establish legally binding contracts between the regions, but identify areas of collaboration and 
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facilitate the sharing of information regarding efforts to address climate change. Over the course 
of the program’s development, California has collaborated with:
•  The Western Climate Initiative (WCI): Formed in February 2007, the WCI is a collaboration 
of independent jurisdictions (U.S. states and Canadian provinces) that work together to 
develop emissions trading programs on the regional and subnational level. California’s 
regulation is consistent with provisions laid out in WCI program design documents and 
linkage with Quebec was facilitated by the initiative.85
•  Acre, Brazil and Chiapas, Mexico: In 2010, Governor Schwarzenegger and representatives of 
Acre, Brazil and Chiapas, Mexico signed a MoU that led to the establishment of a working 
group to provide guidance to California on fighting tropical deforestation and carbon pollution 
around the world through innovative policies that Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD).86 The working group examined design elements, including legal and 
institutional aspects and social and environmental safeguards, to develop a jurisdictional scale 
REDD credit trading system that could be used for compliance within California’s carbon 
market. Final recommendations were released in July 2013.87
•  China: In April 2013, Governor Brown signed a MoU with the National Development and Reform 
Commission of China. The MoU states that both jurisdictions agree to cooperate in “activities 
to implement carbon emission trading systems and other market-based mechanisms.”88 This 
MoU is the formal recognition of an extensive partnership that had been ongoing for more 
than a year between California and China. China is currently establishing and implementing 
pilot cap-and-trade programs in seven of its provinces and cities covering 250 million people.89
•  Australia: In July 2013, Mary Nichols, the chair of CARB, signed a MoU with the Australian 
govern ment’s Clean Energy Regulator to guide collaboration between the agencies in 
addressing the global issue of climate change. Under the agreement, the agencies pledge to 
share information to develop complementary and effective market-based programs to reduce 
GHG pollution, and support and build on the capacity of the international carbon market.90 
The signing came before a turnover in the Australian government which resulted in a 
modification of Australia’s carbon policies.91
•  Pacific Coast Collaborative: In October 2013, Governor Jerry Brown came together with the 
leaders of Oregon, Washington state, and the Canadian province of British Columbia to sign an 
agreement to align their respective climate and clean energy policies. This includes working 
together to “account for the costs of carbon pollution in each jurisdiction” and, where possible, 
link carbon-pricing systems.92
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This timeline shows notable events leading up to the first auction in 
California’s cap-and-trade program, starting in 2012 and continuing 
into the market’s first year. Also included are upcoming milestones 
to look for going into the second compliance period.
TIMELINE OF IMPORTANT MILESTONES
MAY 16
Third quarterly 
auction 
See page 9
JULY 15
CARB publishes pro-
posed amend ments 
to the cap-and-trade 
regu la tion and solicits 
public comment on 
the proposed chang-
es. Consideration of 
amendments is 
scheduled for spring 
2014. 
See page 19
JUNE 27
California’s budget is 
finalized, which in-
cludes a plan to bor-
row $500 million of 
2012 and 2013 pro-
ceeds for the state’s 
budget deficit.
See page 10
JULY 30
CARB Chair, Mary 
Nichols, and the   
Chair of the 
Australian Clean 
Energy Regulator, 
Chloe Munro, sign a 
MoU on sharing in-
formation about mar-
ket-based reduction 
mechanisms.
See page 21
AUGUST 16
Fourth quarterly 
auction  
See page 9
SEPTEMBER 24
CARB issues the first 
offsets that can be 
used by compliance 
entities to meet their 
obligations. 
See page 15
OCTOBER 28
The leaders of 
California, Washington 
state, Oregon, and 
British Columbia sign 
the “Pacific Coast 
Action Plan on 
Climate and Energy” 
to align their respec-
tive climate policies.
See page 21
NOVEMBER 4
Facility-level emis-
sions data for 2012 
published by CARB.  
See page 19
NOVEMBER 19
Fifth quarterly 
 auction
See page 9
NOVEMBER 14
The Sacramento 
Superior Court up-
holds the cap-and-
trade program (see 
November 13, 2012 
and April 16, 2013 for 
suit filings). 
See page 18
JANUARY 1
Linkage with Quebec 
begins. 
See page 17
MARCH
Proposed cap-and-
trade regulation 
amendments sched-
uled to be consid-
ered around this 
time.  
See page 19
NOVEMBER 1
Market participants 
must submit allow-
ances to cover 
30% of their 2013 
emissions.
NOVEMBER 1
Market participants 
must submit allow-
ances to cover the 
rest of their emis-
sions for the first 
compliance period 
(called a “true-up”). 
JANUARY 1
Beginning of second 
compliance period. 
Transportation, natu-
ral gas and other 
fuels come under 
the cap. 
See pages 4–5
DECEMBER 20
The California Public 
Utilities Commission 
approves a plan for 
using proceeds from 
sale of electricity-
sector allowances 
for the benefit of 
ratepayers. 
See page 10
JANUARY 1
Enforceable com-
pliance obligation 
begins. 
See page 5
FEBRUARY 19
Second quarterly 
auction 
See page 9
APRIL 16
The Pacific Legal 
Foundation, repre-
senting Morning Star 
Packing Company, 
files a lawsuit claim-
ing the cap-and-
trade program im-
poses an illegal tax 
(see November 14, 
2013 for resolution).  
See page 18
APRIL 18
Governor Brown re-
leases findings nec-
essary to allow 
California’s cap-and-
trade program to link 
with Quebec’s.
See page 17
JANUARY 25
The San Francisco 
Superior Court up-
holds CARB’s offsets 
program (see March 
28, 2012 for suit fil-
ing). The court’s deci-
sion is thereafter ap-
pealed to the 
California Court of 
Appeal and the case 
is ongoing. 
See page 18
JUNE 19
The California Court 
of Appeal rules in 
favor of CARB in the 
2009 case brought 
forward by a group 
of environmental jus-
tice organizations.* 
NOVEMBER 13
The California Chamber 
of Commerce files a 
lawsuit challenging 
CARB’s authority to 
auction allowances 
(see November 14, 
2013 for resolution).  
See page 18
SEPTEMBER 30
Governor Brown 
signs two legislative 
bills stating that auc-
tion proceeds must 
be used to reduce 
GHG emissions (AB 
1532) and that at least 
25% of the state’s 
proceeds must be in-
vested in a manner 
which benefits disad-
vantaged communi-
ties (SB 535).  
See page 10
JANUARY 1
Cap-and-trade regu-
lation officially takes 
effect, with compli-
ance requirements 
starting in January 
2013. 
See page 18
MARCH 28
The Citizens Climate 
Lobby and Our 
Children’s Earth 
Foundation file a 
combined lawsuit to 
block the use of off-
sets for compliance 
(see January 25, 
2013 for resolution).  
See page 18
NOVEMBER 14
First quarterly  
auction
See page 9
2012 201520142013
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*  Association of Irritated Residents, et al. v. California Air Resources Board, et al., 
No. CPF-09-509562 (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2009).
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EDF interviewed five California carbon experts to glean their unique perspective on the 
progress of the program, including major trends in the state-run auctions, activity on the 
secondary market, and evaluation of how the program’s regulatory design has worked 
in this first year. The experts interviewed include a regulated entity representative, a broker 
active in the carbon market, an industry consultant, a carbon market investor, and an 
academic expert of market-based policies.
Lenny Hochschild
BROKER / EVOLUTION MARKETS
Professional background: Lenny Hochschild is a Managing Director for Evolution Markets, 
an advisory and brokerage firm for environmental markets. Mr. Hochschild manages Evolution 
Markets’ Global Carbon Markets Group and assists a broad base 
of clients in assessing risk, establishing market strategies, and 
executing transactions in the global carbon market.
Q: What major trends have you seen on the trading floor 
throughout the year and what do these say about the overall 
health of the market?
A: There has been a slow and steady increase in participation by 
end users in the market. Given that the first retirements aren’t 
needed until next November, there is no immediate rush to 
purchase allowances, but it is reassuring to see additional 
compliance entities coming into the marketplace. Another trend 
is the relatively consistent liquidity as compared to last year, with significant increases in 
average daily volumes traded.
Q: What accounts for the increasing participation you’ve seen?
A: It is two things. First, it is people understanding better what their compliance positions are. 
Second, it is the feeling now that this program is here to stay. Half of the conversations last year 
[2012] were about lawsuits, regulatory decisions, and if CARB is going to be technically ready. 
The majority of the conversations this year [2013] are around supply and demand, price 
structures, bids and offers, and where value can be achieved.
Q: What do the high volumes trading in the secondary market indicate?
A: High volumes mean a relatively healthy market. The reason why it is important that volumes 
are trading is because when you have market participants who want to transact, liquidity is 
really what they need. Therefore, a better measure of a healthy market is liquidity as opposed 
to price.
Q: What is the status of the offsets market and what role will offsets play in the future?
A: The biggest positive development in offsets has been the issuance of ARBOCs in September. 
I believe that this is going to continue to build confidence in the offset marketplace. There 
is already a fairly well-established offsets market that allows buyers and sellers to procure 
several different structures and types of offset contracts. So far, pricing in the offsets market 
has been stable. While the market doesn’t appear to be in high demand for offsets in the 
“ There is the feeling now that this program is here to stay.”
– Lenny Hochschild, Broker, Evolution Markets
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immediate future, the demand will continue to grow as the program continues to move forward 
and as end users realize that maximizing their percentage of offsets will save them money.
Q: Is it important that CARB set post-2020 goals and if so, when?
A: I think it is important, and the market does too. Market participants and investors want 
certainty, and policymakers need to provide certainty so that people can plan. Companies 
are making decisions now about the types of technology or automobile fleets they are going 
to procure and there needs to be certainty in a post-2020 market as soon as possible.
Q: What were your expectations going into this year and were these expectations met?
A: One year ago I was cautiously optimistic that the program would have a fairly liquid 
secondary market and that there wouldn’t be a court ruling or technical glitch to throw a wrench 
in the works. It has been a quietly successful year. My expectations were not massive amounts of 
liquidity, but I was expecting a slow ramp-up period with no technical, regulatory, or legal 
glitches and so far that is what has happened.
Emilie Mazzacurati
INDUSTRY CONSULTANT / FOUR TWENTY SEVEN
Professional background: Emilie Mazzacurati is the Managing Director of Four Twenty Seven, 
a climate research and advisory firm. She has ten years of experience working on climate policy 
and has published extensively on California cap and trade. 
Previously, she was the Head of Research for North America at 
Thomson Reuters Point Carbon. Emilie holds a Masters from the 
Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and a Masters of Public Policy 
from the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley.
Q: From your perspective, what do the past year’s auction 
results indicate?
A: The auction results have been one of the most positive 
takeaways from this year in the sense that the auctions have gone 
well, they have been well subscribed, they have cleared at very 
reasonable prices, and they have indicated a healthy interest in 
the market with a large number of participants. There has also been moderate turnover of 
participants, with new companies registered at every auction.
Q: What would you consider to be a good price on carbon?
A: From a public policy standpoint, the lower the price, the better. Of course, you don’t want 
it to go lower than the floor price, but generally, a low price means lower costs for compliance 
entities and for ratepayers. It also means a little less money in the state’s coffers, but that is not 
what this program is about. This program is about reducing emissions.
Q: How have AB 32’s complementary measures, such as the Low Carbon Fuel Standard 
(LCFS), affected the market?
A: I think the complementary measures are working well, and that is why prices are where they 
are. CARB is putting a lot of work into planning the next round of policies. The high level of 
com mitment from the governor and involvement of smart scientists from around the state 
mean California is well positioned to reach its 2050 target. Regulatory policies and economic 
incentives will be key to this success, along with cap and trade – the so-called “belt-and-
suspenders” strategy.
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Q: Is it important that CARB set post-2020 goals and if so, when?
A: Yes, I believe post-2020 goals should and will be set fairly soon. I think it is very 
important for the market to know that the program will continue and to know what the 
target will be. As we get closer to 2020, if there is no price signal beyond 2020, then prices 
will definitely fall.
Q: What were your expectations going into this year and were these expectations met?
A: Going into this year, there were a lot of issues still up in the air legally and from a regulatory 
standpoint that have since essentially been resolved or have moved forward enough that 
they are no longer a concern. The market has started, the sky hasn’t collapsed, and the 
auction platform is working smoothly, so I would say that we are in a much better place 
than a year ago.
Q: Do you think the market is here to stay?
A: Yes, I think it is and I think CARB has made that pretty clear.
Morgan Hagerty
INVESTOR / CE2 CAPITAL PARTNERS
Professional background: Morgan Hagerty is a Director at CE2 Capital Partners. Prior to CE2, she 
worked for Morgan Stanley’s Commodities group in New York, EDF Trading in London, and the 
Trust for Public Land in San Francisco. Ms. Hagerty has a BS from 
Boston College, and an MBA and MEM from Duke University.
Q: What is the status of the offsets market and what role will 
offsets play in the future?
A: It has taken CARB longer than some people may have liked 
to approve offset credits, but we understand that it took as long 
as it did because CARB was making sure they got it right and as 
a result, the offsets program should be less exposed to further 
litigation risk. Plus, covered entities don’t need to demonstrate 
compliance until November of 2014, so it is more important to be 
thorough and accurate. I expect the issuance process to be faster 
in the future now that the details of CARB’s review are clear to participants. As for the future of 
the offsets market, there is going to be a point where offsets can actually be an exchange-traded 
commodity and that will come when you have a CCO8 or CCO3 that is past its invalidation 
period. At that point, it doesn’t matter what type of offset it is, where it’s from, who created it, 
who verified it; it cannot be invalidated. Starting three years from now, the market will have a 
true offset commodity, which could be traded on a forward basis, potentially as early as next 
year.
Q: Is it important that CARB set post-2020 goals and if so, when?
A: Yes, we would like post-2020 caps to be set as soon as possible. It just won’t make sense 
at some point to continue to invest in offset projects unless there is certainty that the program 
will continue.
“ The auction results have been one of the most positive take aways from 
this year.”
– Emilie Mazzacurati, Industry Consultant, Four Twenty Seven
CCO stands for California Carbon 
Offset. The ‘3 in CCO3 and ‘8 in 
CCO8 refer to the length of 
invalidation risk associated with 
an offset. Offsets that are verified 
once have a risk of eight years in 
which they may be invalidated by 
CARB. That term can be reduced 
to three years by having a second 
verification done by a second 
approved verifier.93
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Q: What were your expectations going into this year and were these expectations met?
A: After the August 2012 auction was cancelled, I was concerned that the first auction in 
November 2012 might be delayed or possibly even cancelled. So, it was a relief to see that the 
program started as planned. Looking back, I am very happy that we are where we are.
Q: From your perspective, how has the market been going so far?
A: Thus far it has been successful. To me, the most important thing in a cap-and-trade program 
or any other carbon pricing environment is that behavior changes, and behavior is changing. 
Companies are treating power differently; they’re planning long-term industrial facilities 
differently. They are taking into account a carbon price internally when planning, which they 
didn’t have a year ago. To me, that’s success.
Q: Do you think the market is here to stay?
A: Yes, although it might look a little different than it does today.
Karsten Barde
REGULATED ENTITY REPRESENTATIVE / PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY (PG&E)
Professional background: As a Principal Transactor in Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s Energy 
Procurement division, Karsten is responsible for procurement activities on behalf of PG&E’s 
electric customers, including GHG cap-and-trade compliance 
instruments. Previously, Karsten worked in Technology & 
Information Strategy for PG&E’s Electric Operations division. He 
holds an MBA from the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth.
Q: How has your experience been with auction logistics, platform, 
and CITSS account?
A: It has been pretty straightforward. I don’t think we’ve seen any 
major problems with auction logistics so far.
Q: What is the status of the offsets market and what role will 
offsets play in the future?
A: Unfortunately, there hasn’t been a lot happening in the offsets market yet. CARB has 
just issued its first credits, and that’s great because the physical availability should support 
greater trading. However, I think the big constraint on trading has been the principle of 
buyer liability. There is no standard agreement for seller liability yet, and market participants 
are still figuring out how to price that risk. The market also needs more transparent pricing and 
volume information.
Q: Is it important that CARB set post-2020 goals and if so, when?
A: If CARB extends the cap-and-trade program, it would provide more certainty to the market. 
Auction results seem to suggest that participants think the market will continue to 2020 and 
“ The most important thing in a cap-and-trade program…is that 
behavior changes, and behavior is changing. [California companies] 
are taking into account a carbon price internally when planning…
To me, that’s success.”
– Morgan Hagerty, Investor, CE2 Capital Partners
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therefore it is worth banking, but I don’t think there’s certainty yet beyond 2020. Long-term 
regulatory certainty would help everyone better plan for the future.
Q: What were your expectations going into this year and were these expectations met?
A: A year ago at this time, PG&E was wrapping up efforts to prepare for cap-and-trade, final-
izing internal systems and preparing to implement our plans. At that point there was still a 
lot of market anxiety and a lot of interest. Looking back now, things have been pretty smooth. 
Overall, I think market participants are comfortable that the program is working and the market 
is working. Liquidity is the one area where I’d say I don’t yet see what I hope to see and expect 
to see in the secondary market for allowances.
Q: Do you think the market is here to stay?
A: Yes, although it probably depends on the long-term price impacts, as well as whether other 
jurisdictions join the program or whether California consumers are asked to go at it alone.
Robert Stavins
ACADEMIC EXPERT / HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Professional background: Robert N. Stavins is the Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Govern-
ment in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Director of the 
Harvard Environmental Economics Program. Professor Stavins’ 
research focuses on diverse areas of environ mental economics and 
policy, including examinations of market-based policy instruments, 
of which cap and trade is one. He has studied California’s program 
closely since its inception and has established himself as an 
authority through numerous publications on the topic.
Q: From your perspective, what do the past year’s auction 
results indicate?
A: In my view, the performance of the auctions indicates that the 
auction mechanisms themselves were well designed. The prices 
for the allowances were close to the floor price and this means 
that the marginal—or incremental—cost of control is relatively low. That’s good news, not bad 
news. One reason for this relatively low allowance price is the reduced demand because of the 
recent recession. That’s good news about the cap-and-trade mechanism because it tells us that 
it’s counter cyclical and that cap and trade doesn’t continue to punish the economy when it’s not 
necessary, as a carbon tax would. But, to some degree, the low-end allowance prices are due to 
the reality of the complementary policies that also have an effect on regulated businesses. I 
don’t think this is a problem of the cap-and-trade mechanism itself, but it is the reality of placing 
so-called complementary policies under the umbrella of the cap-and-trade mechanism.
Q: Has implementation of AB32 impacted expectations about the future of cap and trade at 
the federal and/or international level?
A: Internationally, people are very aware of the cap-and-trade program. I spend a lot of time in 
Europe and certainly everyone there is watching it closely. The EU is very hopeful because they 
“ Long-term regulatory certainty would help everyone better plan for 
the future.”
– Karsten Barde, Regulated entity representative, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Marginal/incremental cost of 
control is the increase or 
decrease in total cost for the 
production of one additional unit 
of output. In this case, it is a 
measurement of the additional 
cost of carbon allowances to the 
output of regulated facilities.
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were let down by the fact the Waxman-Markey bill didn’t move forward in the Senate. So they’re 
very hopeful about what happens in California. If the California system is perceived to be a 
failure (it almost doesn’t matter if it is actually a failure or not), then that could be the nail in 
the coffin for additional jurisdictions not only to take on cap-and-trade mechanisms, but more 
importantly to take on climate policies in general. That is why I think it is important that this 
program be well designed. And I think it basically is well-designed, other than having all these 
other complementary policies. Many of those other policies, such as the Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard, Renewable Electricity programs, and energy efficiency programs, won’t achieve 
anything additional environmentally since they are acting on sources that are within the cap-
and-trade program.
Q: Do you feel that the cost containment provisions included in the program will be 
sufficient to keep prices low in the future?
A: This question hinges on whether there will be a sufficient supply of credible offsets to meet 
the demand from the market. And that’s a legitimate concern because the state has not been 
moving as fast as one might have thought in terms of coming up with the definitions of different 
types of offsets. There is fundamentally a tradeoff between having an adequate number of 
offsets in the system, and the level of scrutiny placed on additionality.
Q: What are your expectations for the linkage with Quebec? Should California be looking to 
link with other programs in the future?
A: The impacts of linkage will be felt in Quebec, not California. Linkage is not going to affect the 
California market, but will affect the Quebec market due to the relative size of the two. That said, 
I think it is important that California links with credible policies in other jurisdictions. They 
don’t have to be cap-and-trade mechanisms. They can be carbon taxes for instance. This system 
of bilateral bottom-up linkage is, at this point in time, the implicit future of international 
cooperation. Everyone is coming to accept that we’re not going to see a top-down Kyoto 
Protocol-like mechanism. Rather, it’s going to be partly some kind of bottom-up system, what is 
referred to as a “hybrid system.” Linkage is going to be a very important part of it.
Q: Do you think the market is here to stay?
A: Yes, I think it will be here through the year 2020, which is the current limit in the regulation.
“ The auction mechanisms themselves were well designed. Cap and trade 
doesn’t continue to punish the economy when it’s not necessary, as a 
carbon tax would.”
– Robert Stavins, Academic expert, Harvard University
The American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, otherwise 
known as the Waxman-Markey 
bill, was an attempt to establish 
a federal cap-and-trade program. 
The bill was approved by the 
House of Representatives, 
but was not considered in the 
Senate.94
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